Too Old to Die Young, Too Young to Die Now: Are
Early Retirement Incentives in Higher Education
Necessary, Legal, and Ethical?
MarianneC. DelPo"
The charge to the Department Chairs seemed simple enough:
diversify your faculty. Add more women, more people of color, more
members of minority religions, more physically challenged folks, and
more gay and bisexual individuals. The College offered assistance in
the recruitment process by providing funds both to attend hiring
events populated by a more diverse pool of applicants and to hire
human resources consultants to develop and implement an effective
search for qualified people with diverse characteristics. The College
even offered leeway in starting salaries and benefits to assist in
bidding wars for desirable candidates. This was a worthy effort, too.
After all, it was becoming increasingly important to expose students
to both faculty and peers who would more closely mirror the
managers and colleagues whom they would encounter in the
workplace of the new millennium.
Nonetheless, the goal of
diversifying the faculty could not be achieved unless there were
openings into which to hire.
With no dramatic increase in
enrollment expected in the foreseeable future, openings would only
arise when current faculty members left the College. Of course, this
happened from time to time for a variety of reasons, but, mostly,
tenured faculty members remained at their posts until retirement.
After all, were not job security and institutional continuity among the
reasons for achieving tenure?
The Dean pondered this dilemma and considered how to
encourage more senior faculty members to vacate their positions
sooner than planned. Knowing that tenured faculty could rarely be
fired or forced to retire, the Dean considered taking some of the
funds earmarked for elaborate diversity recruitment and spending
them instead on retirement incentives. Why not offer a lump sum to
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tenured professors aged sixty to sixty-five to encourage them to retire
sooner rather than later? For that matter, why not offer an even
larger sum to professors aged fifty-five to sixty? This would be a
dramatic step, which no doubt would cause a degree of controversy
on campus, so the Dean needed to analyze the strategy carefully.
First, was there a way to achieve the College's objectives without
resorting to what might seem a crass move of paying people to leave?
Second, was this idea legal, or did it constitute a form of age
discrimination because the incentives would be targeted only at
younger members of the senior faculty in an effort to get them to
retire sooner than when health or other personal considerations
would otherwise trigger retirement? Finally, was this an ethical
decision or something that instead cut right at the heart of those
ideals most valuable to the Dean, the College, and academia at large,
such as fairness and policies that further only equal treatment of all?
This Article addresses each of these queries for the paradigmatic
Dean in an attempt to lend some clarity to a rather murky issue of
employment law.
I. NECESSARY? BEST SOLUTION TO "DEAD WOOD" AND "TIME IS OF
THE ESSENCE" FOR DIVERSIFICATION OF FACULTY

The natural attrition rate of college professors is notoriously
low.' This creates two problems in the diversification of a faculty.
First, the low attrition rate leads to an accumulation of older
professors with little job-related incentive to innovate, to improve, or
to update their skills.2 While many older professors are self-motivated
in these areas, many simply are not. For these latter, with virtually
guaranteed job security and usually little salary-increase incentive,
there exists a growing gap with their younger, more motivated, and
recently trained colleagues as well as with the ever-young student
population itself. Furthermore, even those older professors who
keep themselves abreast of current pedagogy, research, technological
skills, and popular culture to which their student audiences can relate
contribute to a second problem: they tend to be white, heterosexual,
Christian men without physical disabilities! There is a finite number
See Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Book Review, 51 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 138, 138
(1997) (reviewing MATrHEW W. FINIUN, THE CASE FOR TENURE (1996)); see also Aaron
Zitner, Colleges Push Retirement Bi4 BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19, 1998, at Al.
See Ehrenberg, supra note 1, at 138; see also Douglas Lederman, Senior-Citizen
Lobby Takes on HigherEducation over Bill on Early Retirement, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,

May31, 1998, at A47.
See Zitner, supra note 1, at Al.
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of seats on any faculty, so when older faculty members hold a large
percentage of these seats, it becomes difficult to find ways to add
diversity to the faculty.
Of course, cultural changes are often inherently slow; perhaps
American academe should simply allow this diversity transition to
occur naturally, as it almost inevitably will over time when older
professors die or eventually choose retirement due to declining
health or other circumstances relating to older age. There are two
arguments against this laissez-faire approach to the removal of older
professors. First, it does not address the "dead wood" problem that
many older professors present. Second, the diversification rate will
not keep up with that experienced in the rest of the workforce, and
it is largely that "real world" workforce that most students will enter.
To the extent that part of the learning occurring on college
campuses is experiential as opposed to the accumulation of
substantive knowledge, it is vital that students acquire skills in
interacting with a diverse population not only of peers but also of
authority figures. Thus, time is of the essence in transforming the
population of American faculties.
This begs the question: Are age-staggered economic retirement
incentives the only way to realize these objectives? If not, then one
must address whether such incentives are the best way to do so. For
years, a mandatory retirement age went quite far in limiting "dead
wood" and in keeping the door revolving somewhat steadily on
entrance to American faculties.5 In 1994, a mandatory retirement age
became illegal in American higher education, and so, United States
colleges and universities have been exploring alternative
means of
6
achieving their objectives of removing senior faculty.
Another alternative that has been explored to varying degrees is
that of "post-tenure review."7 While most faculties have resisted this
change as a threat to the job security associated with tenure, there is a
trend toward increased scrutiny of senior faculty, particularly at state
schools where taxpayers are increasingly demanding accountability
among older faculty.8 Indeed, the removal of mandatory retirement
ages and the resultant increase in unproductive older faculty have
4 See id.

See Lederman, supra note 2, at A47.
See Ruth Flower, Faculty Retirement Incentives (visited Jan. 28, 2000) <http:
//www.aaup.org/hearetr.htm>.
7 See Jennifer Gillan, Procedures for the Evaluation of Tenured
Faculty (Apr.
1999) (on file with Faculty Evaluation Procedures Committee, Bentley College).
8 See id.; Ehrenberg, supranote 1, at 138.
5
6
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contributed to the general disfavor in which tenure is held by the
taxpaying public.9 One answer to this has been the introduction of
heightened scrutiny of the performance and productivity of tenured
faculty members at state institutions. To be a viable alternative to
economic retirement incentives, these post-tenure reviews must have
teeth:
they must be tied to some real threat of negative
consequences. In the nonacademic world, these negative
consequences would be demotion orjob loss. In the world of tenure,
such threats are unavailable unless universities effectively eliminate
tenure. This, of course, raises a host of other issues, such as the
benefit of academic freedom that the grant of tenure accords, which
are beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say, however, that in
the short term tenure is likely to remain the norm at most American
institutions of higher education.'0
At private schools, the approach to post-tenure review appears to
involve more of a carrot than a stick." Tying salary increases and
other compensation, such as research or curriculum development
grants, to demonstrations of consistent publications, classroom
innovation, or other measurable productivity, seems a less
threatening way to encourage post-tenure growth. Still, schools have
been slow to adopt these policies, in part, because of resistance from
powerful senior faculty and, in part, due to a lack of substantial
available funds.12
Furthermore, these measures, even when
implemented, motivate only a subset of the "dead wood crowd," many
of whom are content simply to show up, do the minimum required,
and collect a paycheck.
Post-tenure review will not solve the diversification problem
unless it results in firings that create openings for new and more
diverse faculty members. Because this is unlikely without the demise
of the tenure system itself, post-tenure review does not provide a
short-term solution to the time-sensitive need to diversify American
faculties.
Another alternative to economic retirement incentives may be
individualized negotiations.
Some colleges prefer to approach
individual older professors with proffered retirement packages rather
than to offer publicly an incentive package to all tenured professors
in a particular age range. i This may raise legal and ethical issues
9 See Gillan, supra note 7; Ehrenberg, supra note 1, at 138.
10 See Ehrenberg, supra note 1, at 139.
3 See Gillan, supra note 7.
2 Seeid.
is See id.
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similar to those raised by college-wide retirement incentive initiatives,
but it may also cause less campus commotion. There may be other
alternatives to economic retirement incentives, but to date American
colleges and universities have not yet discovered them.
II. LEGAL? No APPARENT CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIER AND NEW
STATUTORY SUPPORT

Up until thirty-five years ago, it was legal to use age as a criterion
in making job-related decisions, including establishing an age at
which all employees, regardless of individual health or fitness to
continue working, must retire. In 1967, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act 5 (ADEA) outlawed most age-based job decisions,
but permitted the continuance of mandatory retirement ages in most
workplaces.' 6 Congress finally put the proverbial nails in the coffin of
mandatory retirement in 1978 by making mandatory retirement
illegal,17 but higher education successfully lobbied for an exemption
that delayed implementation of this newest age-discrimination
prohibition until year-end 1993.18 Then, as the tenure system
persisted, the problem of accumulating older professors with
diminishing incentives for productivity worsened with the loss of
mandatory
retirement.
Colleges
and universities began
experimenting with economic incentives to encourage early
retirement.2 Targeted at the "youngest" of the older faculty, these
incentive programs were challenged as violations of the ADEA
because they were not made available to the oldest faculty members
and because larger incentives were often offered to the youngest
senior faculty rather than to the mid-range, older faculty.2 ' Fearing
costly and repetitive litigation, United States institutions of higher
education turned to Congress to lobby for statutory authority for
their incentive programs.2 In 1998, these efforts proved fruitful as
Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law, amendments
14 Of course, decisions to treat individual faculty members
differently also opens
the door to additional discrimination claims based on perceived illegal selection
criteria, such as gender, religion, or ethnic origin.
Is 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
6 See Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 167-68
(1989) (discussing United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977)).
17 See id.
is See Ehrenberg, supra note 1, at 138; Flower, supra note 6.
19 See Ehrenberg, supra note 1, at 138; Flower,
supra note 6.
20 See Flower, supra note
6.
2
See Zitner, supra note 1, at Al; Lederman, supra note 2, at A47.
See Flower, supranote 6.
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to the Higher Education Act,2 which explicitly endorse the use of
age-staggered economic incentives for retirement in institutions of
higher education. 4 Two legal questions remain: Are such incentives
constitutional? Are the amendments to the Higher Education Act in
conflict with the clear provisions of the ADEA?2
A.

Economic RetirementIncentives Are Likely to Pass Rational
Relation Test

The United States Supreme Court long ago ruled that age is not
a suspect class requiring strict scrutiny in the face of an equal
protection challenge.2 Indeed, in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia," the Court explicitly upheld a mandatory retirement age
policy for the Massachusetts State Police as rationally related to the
state's legitimate purpose of "protect[ing] the public by assuring
physical preparedness of its uniformed police."28 Although this
decision predated the statutory prohibition of mandatory retirement
age policies in most workplaces," the precedent remains good law
both because the ADEA preserved mandatory retirement ages for
firefighters and law enforcement officers as an explicit statutory
exception to the general prohibition ° and because the extrastatutory

23

29 U.S.CA § 623(m) (West Supp. 1999).

24 See generally S. CONF. REP. No. 11069 (1998).
25

An additional question pertains to whether relief is available under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in age discrimination lawsuits against
public institutions of higher learning. The Supreme Court, in the recent case of
Kimel v. Floida Board of Regents, appears to have answered that question in the
negative. See Kimel 120 S. Ct. 631, 650 (2000) (holding that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not allow Congress to impose the ADEA on
government employers because age is not a suspect classification; rather, the
Eleventh Amendment proscription of lawsuits by private individuals against
nonconsenting states controls in the area of age discrimination). But see Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908) (holding that suits against state officials for
injunctive relief are not barred by a state's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment). Also note that state age discrimination statutes paralleling the ADEA
do offer similar relief against state employers. See Kime4 120 S.Ct. at 650 & n.*.
See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)
(stating that "a standard less than strict scrutiny 'has consistently been applied to
state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities'") (citations
omitted). In Murgia, the United States Supreme Court found that "the class of
uniformed state police officers over 50 (did not] constitute a suspect class for
purwoses of equal protection analysis." Id.; accord Kime4 120 S. Ct. at 635.
427 U.S. 307 (1976).
28 See id. at 314.
See Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 167-68
(1989) (discussing United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977)).
so See 29 U.S.C.§ 6230) (Supp. IV 1992).
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protection afforded older Americans employed in the public sector
by the Equal Protection Clause remains limited to a rational relation
standard of review.
Under a rational relation analysis, the use of economic
incentives to encourage early retirement of state university professors
would likely pass constitutional muster in the face of the legitimate
government objective of saving costs associated with higher salaries
and benefits of senior faculty even if the objectives of removing "dead
wood" and diversifying the faculty were viewed as illegitimate. Of
course, this analysis would only apply to state institutions of higher
education, but, then, Congress gave older employees, both public
and private, a stronger tool than the Fourteenth Amendment when it
passed the ADEA.
B.

Age Discriminationin Employment Act (ADEA), As Evolved, May
or May Not PermitEarly Retirement Incentives

The ADEA, as amended, prohibits arbitrary age discrimination
in retirement programs.3
The statute, however, does allow an
employer to provide age-based differences in the terms of a bona fide
employee benefit plan, including a retirement or pension plan, if
that plan neither requires involuntary retirement because of age nor
is inconsistent with the purposes of the ADEA." Accordingly, in the
1989 decision Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts," the
United States Supreme Court upheld a retirement plan that allowed
disability benefits to be taken only if one retired by age sixty.'
In Betts, the Court held that age-based differences in retirement
benefits need not be justified by increased cost of benefits of older
workers, although this is one way to demonstrate a benign purpose to
such a plan.3" Instead, the Court focused on the statutory language of
the time and the legislative intent of the then-current version of the
benefit plan exception. The Betts Court observed that, because the
31 See Betts, 492 U.S. at 167-68 (discussing McMann); see also id. at 175-76.
32 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1993). Earlier statutory language under
the ADEA provided that a bona fide employment plan could not be "subterfuge to
evade the purposes of" the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1988). Current language
eliminates the intent requirement by outlawing any program that fails to be
"consistent with the ... purposes" of the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (B) (ii) (Supp.
V 1993); see also Betts, 492 U.S. at 167-68 (discussing McMann); Auerbach v. Board of
Educ. of the Harborfields Cent. Sch. Dist. of Greenlawn, 136 F.3d 104, 110-12 (2d
Cir. 1998) (discussing ADEA legislative history).

492 U.S. 158 (1989).

3
5

See id. at 182.
See id. at 175.
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ADEA's primary purpose was to encourage the hiring of older
Americans, the legislature actively sought to relieve employers of the
relatively high cost of benefits for older workers so as to encourage
employers to hire them.3
Hence, the Court concluded that
employee benefit plans, long age-based in their provisions, were
largely exempted from the ADEA prohibitions unless the employee
could prove that the plan "actually was intended to serve the purpose
of discriminating in some non-fringe-benefit aspect of the
employment relation[ship] .
This could be proven, the Court
suggested, by a showing that the employer reduced all employee
salaries and then dramatically increased the benefits of younger
employees as a means of indirectly achieving a wage disparity based
on age." Absent proof of such intent, the Court viewed the ADEA as
a relatively useless weapon against age-staggered employee benefits."
In the wake of Betts, Congress amended the ADEA to strengthen
the provisions dealing with employee benefit packages. In 1990,
Congress explicitly made it unlawful to discriminate based on age in
employee benefit plans unless an employer can demonstrate
increased costs associated with providing benefits to older workers.4
Thus, cost now became the only way for an employer to justify age
discrimination in a benefit plan, and an employee no longer needed
to prove that an employer intended to undermine the ADEA to
challenge successfully such a plan."'
In addition, Congress, in 1990, statutorily separated employee

36 See id. at 176-79.

Id. at 181.
See id. at 180.
39 See Betts, 492 U.S.
at 177, 181.
40 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. 11 1990). In relevant
part, the ADEA
provides that
[i]t shall not be unlawful for an employer...
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan(i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual
amount of payment made or cost incurred on behalf of
an older worker is no less than that made or incurred on
behalf of a younger worker ... or
(ii) that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan
consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes of this
chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (B) (Supp. V 1993); see also Auerbach v. Board of Educ. of the
Harborfields Cent. Sch. Dist. of Greenlawn, 136 F.3d 104, 110-12 (2d Cir. 1998)
(discussing ADEA legislative history).
41 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2)(B)(i) (Supp. 11 1990); Auerbach, 136
F.3d at 110-12
(discussing ADEA legislative history).
37
3
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benefit plans from early retirement incentive plans.4 Significantly,
the amended statute concerning employee benefit plans does not
have the same requirements as for retirement incentive plans. For
employee benefit plans, the statute requires that the plans be
identical or, if they are different, that they must cost substantially the
same. In contrast, for retirement incentive plans, the statute requires
primarily what the Betts Court held earlier was the rule for all
employee benefit plans: that such an incentive plan be voluntary and
consistent with the ADEA's relevant purposes' and not .necessarily
justifiable by cost differential. Thus, Betts is still good law as regards
early retirement incentive plans."
This leaves open the issue of whether age-staggered economic
retirement incentives are indeed inconsistent with the purposes of
the ADEA. If the elimination of an arbitrary mandatory retirement
age is one such purpose, and if such incentives indirectly achieve this
now-outlawed goal, then arguably they would be inconsistent with
relevant ADEA goals. In Betts, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the ADEA's purposes included "'to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment[.] " 5 The Betts Court did not address
the issue of whether an early retirement incentive plan that
undermined the ADEA's explicit provision forbidding employers
from "discharg[ing] any individual .. . because of such individual's
age " would violate the statute. Congress, in amending the ADEA in
1978 to clarify its intent to outlaw mandatory age-based retirement,
reiterated that the ADEA was intended to allow age-based benefit
reductions only based on age-related cost considerations, not those
based on arbitrary age assumptions about job competence. 7 This
indicates that Congress considered mandatory retirement based on
42

See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. H 1990); Auerbach, 136 F.3d at 110-12

(discussing ADEA legislative history).
43 See Auerbach, 136 F.3d at 112 (citation
omitted).
44 Of course, Betts was decided at a time when
the statutory language prohibited
any benefit plan (including retirement incentive plans) that were "subterfuge to
evade the purposes of" the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1988). That particular
component of the Betts Court's articulated standard is removed by the new statutory
language, which removes the intent requirement and focuses instead on the impact of
retirement incentive programs; the impact must now be "consistent with the...
purposes" of the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1993); see also supra
note 32 (discussing the changes in the statutory language of the ADEA).
45 Betts, 492 U.S. at 176 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988)); see also
Auerbach, 136
F.3d at 112 (citing 136 CONG. REc. 27061 (1990) and 136 CONG. REc. 25352-53
(1990)).
47

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988).
See Auerbach, 136 F.3d at 111 (citing 124 CONG. REc. 8218-19 (1978) (remarks

of SenatorJavits) and 123 CONG. REc. 34295 (1977) (remarks of Senator Williams)).
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age to be a form of "arbitrary age discrimination" 48prohibited by the
ADEA.
C.

LowerFederal CourtsAttempt to Apply the ADEA to Early
Retirement Incentives in Education

In 1986, the Second Circuit ruled on the issue of economic
retirement incentives as an alleged violation of the ADFA. In
Cipriano v. Board of Education of the City School District of North
Tonawanda,New York,4 9 the court placed the burden on the employer
to demonstrate that its plan, which offered extra funds to public
school teachers between the ages of fifty-five and sixty who retired
during any of the three years during which the plan was in effect, was
not intended to evade the ADEA's purposes." While this court
insisted that the employer need defend such a plan "by showing a
legitimate business reason for structuring the plan as it did[,]" 5 ' the
Supreme Court in Betts later ruled that the burden in such cases is on
the plaintiff to demonstrate an intent to undermine the ADEA.
Congress mooted the "intent" requirement by rewording the statute
from "subterfuge to evade the purposes" to "[in]consistent with the
purposes" of the ADEA.52 Still, the underlying concept that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof in an ADEA challenge remains
good law, at least for early retirement incentive plans." Therefore,
the plaintiff must show that an early retirement incentive plan has at
least the effect (regardless of its intent) of undermining the ADEA's
purposes. Furthermore, the Cipriano court did not foreclose the
possibility that an employer could indeed justify such "early
retirement plans" if called to do so. Rather, the court indicated an
openness to a rather minimal showing to successfully defend such a
plan.54
The Seventh Circuit addressed such a defense in 1988. In Karlen

49
50

See29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986).

See id. at 58.

51 ML

29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f0(2) (B) (ii) (Supp. V 1993); see
also supra notes 32 and 44 (discussing the changes in the statutory language of the
52

ADEA).

53 Employee benefit plans other than retirement incentive plans
now have the
additional statutory requirement of demonstrating that reduced benefits based on
age nonetheless cost the employer the same as those benefits accorded younger
employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (B) (i) (Supp. V 1993).
See Cipriano,785 F.2d at 59.
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5 the court
v. City Colleges of Chicago,
reviewed a complaint filed by
three professors challenging an early retirement plan.5
While
sympathizing "with the concerns of those who believe that the quality
of American higher education is endangered by the prospect of
faculty gerontocracies protected by"57 the ADEA, the Karlen court did
not accept these concerns as legitimate business reasons for adopting
early retirement incentive plans.58 The court held that such plans
attempt to undermine the purposes of the ADEA by re-creating a
form of mandatory age-based retirement."
In the only decision on early retirement incentive plans after
Betts and the 1990 ADEA amendments, the Second Circuit, in 1998,
upheld such a plan challenged by fourteen Long Island, New York,
public school teachers. The court, in Auerbach v. Board of Education of
the Harborfields Central School District of Greenlawn,60 allowed the
challenged plan to continue because the court viewed the plan as
voluntary, available for a reasonable time period, and consistent with
congressional intent to permit "the proliferation of early retirement
incentive plans" that "may help employers and workers meet
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 6' The
Auerbach court distinguished the Long Island plan from the one
struck down in Karlen as offering all eligible employees the same flat
dollar amount rather than a variable amount that decreased with the
age of the eligible employee."' The key for the Auerbach court was
that there was no discrimination based on age within the plan itself.

837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1988). This case was decided pre-Betts, so the burden
was presumed to be on the employer to prove an intent to undermine goals of the
ADEA. Cf Robinson v. County of Fresno, 882 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1989) (the first postBetts court of appeals case). In Robinson, the court assigned the burden to the
plaintiff and required that the plaintiff show more than the mere absence of cost
reduction because absence of cost reduction was not the only way that an employer
canjustify differential treatment, as per Betts. See id.at 44647.
See Karekn, 837 F.2d at 315.
5 Id. at 320.
58 See id.
See id. Specifically, the court stated that colleges "cannot be allowed by
indirection to reinstitute what was for so long the age-65 mandatory retirement
norm." Id.
60 136 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
61 Id. at 113 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-263, at 28 (1990), reprinted
in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1533).
62

See Auerbach, 136 F.3d at 114.
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D. No Final Wordfrom the United States Supreme Court on the
GeneralStatutory Issue, but CongressionalClarificationin the
Arena of HigherEducation
The United States Supreme Court has never resolved the
statutory issue of whether early retirement plans can be justified by
"business reasons" other than cost differentials, such as the goal of
eliminating "dead wood" or diversifying faculty. The Karlen court
appears to indicate that these very reasons demonstrate an
intentional effort to reinstitute a maximum retirement age in
contravention of the purposes of the ADEA. In contrast, the Auerbach
court seems to condone such "business reasons" as long as the plan
itself does not treat eligible employees differently due to age. Of
course, American institutions of higher education prefer to use
Karlen-type plans in which retirement incentives are age-staggeredoffering the most money to the youngest senior faculty, less to midrange senior faculty, and no funds to those who choose to remain
past age sixty-five. Before the Supreme Court could resolve the issue
of exactly which type of early retirement incentive plan, if any, is
consistent with ADEA goals and, therefore, not violative of the federal
statute, Congress acted instead.
Private universities wanted to avoid the cost of litigation over the
issue of age-based economic retirement incentives when their special
statutory exemption from the ADEA's prohibition on mandatory
retirement expired on December 31, 1993. 63 Therefore, with the
support of the American Association of University Professors and a
report of the National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education
demonstrating the positive impact of early-retirement incentive plans
on the costs of higher education," American higher education
lobbied heavily for codification of a statutory exception for agestaggered economic retirement incentives for higher education. The
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), which filed an
amicus curia brief on behalf of the plaintiff teachers in Cipriano,6
provided the strongest opposition to the lobbying effort. The AARP
succeeded in two successive sessions of Congress in killing bills that
sought to amend the Higher Education Act to allow colleges to use
63 See Lederman, supra note 2, at A47; Flower, supra note 6; Zitner, supra note
1,

at Al.

64 See Report of the National Commission on the Cost of HigherEducation
(visited Jan.
21, 1998) <http://www.aaup.org/rpctcst.htm>; Commission on College Costs Features
Fact over Fiction (visitedJan. 29, 2000) <http://www.aaup.org/prccsLhtm>.
See Cipriano v. Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of North Tonawanda, N.Y.,
785 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1986).
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age-based incentives to encourage tenured faculty members to
retire.6 Finally, a bill proposing such amendments passed Congress,
becoming effective on October 7, 1998.67
The Amendments to the Higher Education Act were
incorporated into the ADEA as an itemized exception to the ADEA's
general prohibitions.0 Institutions of higher education may use agebased incentives for retirement provided that no preexisting
retirement rights or benefits are reduced or eliminated.6 Further, all
employees (even the oldest) must be allowed to take advantage of the
maximum
benefit of incentive offering during its first 180 days in
70
effect.
To date, no one has challenged the amendments in court. Such
a challenge would be unlikely to succeed. Although the Betts decision
appears to require that a plan not undermine ADEA purposes, this
reasoning is based on statutory language that has twice since been
changed in relevant ways. First, Congress eliminated the intent
requirement by outlawing only early-retirement incentive plans that
are inconsistent in their impact on ADEA goals.7' Second, Congress
has now exempted specifically designed higher education agestaggered early-retirement incentive plans from the Karlen court's
presumed violation of the ADEA's prohibition of mandatory age66
67
68
69

Id.

70
71

See Lederman, supranote 2, at A47.
See generaUyS. CoNF. REP. No. 11069 (1998).
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(m) (West Supp. 1999).
In relevant part, the ADEA provides that
it shall not be a violation... solely because a plan of an institution of
higher education . . . offers employees who are serving under a
contract of unlimited tenure... supplemental benefits upon voluntary
retirement that are reduced or eliminated on the basis of age, if(1) such institution does not implement with respect to such
employees any age-based reduction or cessation of benefits that
are not such supplemental benefits...
(2) such supplemental benefits are in addition to any
retirement or severance benefits which have been offered
generally to employees serving under a contract of unlimited
tenure... within the preceding 365 days; and
(3) any employee who attains the minimum age and satisfies all
non-age-based conditions for receiving a benefit under the plan
has an opportunity lasting not less than 180 days to elect to
retire and to receive the maximum benefit that could then be
elected by a younger but otherwise similarly situated employee.

See id.
See supra note 44 (discussing the changes in the statutory language of the

ADEA).
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based retirement.7 Thus, even if such programs generally violate the
ADEA by undermining the purpose of eliminating arbitrary age-based
discrimination in retirement," the world of higher education, if it
designs its plans carefully,4 is insulated from charges of ADEA
violations. Congress, having created the rule, is certainly free to
fashion exceptions to it.
III. ETHICAL? PLANS THAT PASS THE STATUTORY EXCEPTION SEEM
SUFFICIENTLY FAIR TO OUTWEIGH THEIR NEGATIVE IMPACT

Some cry foul about age-staggered economic retirement
incentives because they exclude the oldest faculty members, thereby
discriminating against them merely on the basis of their age. 75 This
claim is addressed by the provisions of the ADEA that allow all faculty
members to take advantage of a new incentive program during its
introductory phase so that older faculty members find themselves
excluded only by failure to act during that initial window or, once a
program has been established, by simply outliving the eligibility
period.
The loudest outcry against the use of economic incentives to
induce early retirement of tenured faculty in higher education is that
these incentives operate as an end-run around the prohibition on
mandatory age-based retirement. 76 The argument here is twofold.
First, even though the incentives are voluntary, their age-staggered
nature, by which the older one retires the less one receives, will have
the impact of creating a "usual" retirement age.
Second, the
voluntariness of the incentive programs is illusory because most older
faculty members simply cannot afford not to take advantage of such
economic incentives. In effect, these faculty feel pressured, if not
forced, to retire substantially earlier than their health or other
personal reasons might dictate. While this may not be illegal, some
See 29 U.S.CA. § 623(m) (West Supp. 1999). Supplemental retirement
benefits may be both reduced (allowing for tiered benefits reduced at various ages)
and eliminated (allowing for a maximum age for a benefit) on the basis of age. See
id.
It is uncertain whether the Karlen court's reasoning that age-staggered
retirement incentives (in contrast to flat dollar-amount incentives such as that
upheld in Auerbach) violates the ADEA by failing to be consistent with the purposes
of the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (B) (ii) (Supp. V 1993).
74 The maximum benefit offered under any plan must be
open to all employees
for 180 days and no plan can require actual retirement within 180 days of an
employee's election to participate in the plan. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(m) (3) (West
SupP. 1999).
See Lederman, supra note 2, at A47; Zitner, supranote 1, at Al.
See Lederman, supra note 2, at A47.
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claim it is unethical in its impact. To assess the ethics of the
incentives, one must evaluate the total impact of their
implementation, including the opportunity for ridding faculties of
"dead wood," the opportunity to diversify faculties sooner, and the
opportunity for those "younger" senior faculty to retire earlier than
they otherwise could have afforded. It is useful to do this analytical
balancing assessment from a business perspective because employee
management, even in higher education, involves business decisions.
There are a variety of models available to assist in an ethical
analysis of business decisions."
Among these models are the
Blanchard and Peale test, the Front-Page-of-the-Newspaper test, the
Laura Nash test, the Wall Street Journal model, teleology,78 and
deontology79 At least two of these tests, the Blanchard and Peale test
and Wall Street Journal model, start by asking whether the
contemplated business behavior is legal, while others consider legality
as part of a stakeholder analysis." Ethical analyses that require a
threshold inquiry about legality result in the need to proceed to a
secondary level of analysis if the action is deemed legal-a necessary
but insufficient requirement for an ethical decision under these
analyses. Because this Article concludes that economic incentives for
early retirement are legal under current United States law, it is
necessary to answer additional questions to address the ethics of a
decision to offer such incentives.
Under the Blanchard and Peale test, assuming that the legality
requirement is met, the decision to offer age-staggered economic
retirement incentives turns on whether that decision is balanced and
how it would make the decision maker feel."' The decision arguably
is balanced because it positively affects almost everyone involved:
alumni (the equivalent of company shareholders), whose alma mater
would have its reputation improved through faculty excellence and
7

The first four models are presented in some detail in

BusiNEss:
78
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MARIANNE

M. JENNINGS,

LEGAL, ETHICAL, AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 31-67 (4th ed. 1997).

Teleology "judges the rightness or wrongness of conduct by weighing the

consequences of the conduct." EDWARD J. CONRY ET AL., THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF
BusINEss 21 (3d ed. 1993).
7
"Deontology, in contrast [to teleology], rejects the importance of
consequences and holds that there is an ethical character to acts themselves that
determines whether or not one should do them." Id.; see supra note 78 (discussing
teleology); see also infra note 88 (discussing the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, a
deontologist). "[D]eontologists believe that consequences are difficult to forecast

and that they often lead to ethically wrong conduct." CONRY ET AL., supra note 78, at

45.

so SeeJENNINGS, supra note 77, at 55-57.
81

See id. at 55.
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diversity; most remaining faculty members, whose professional lives
would presumably be enriched by a more diverse faculty; and
students, who would be exposed to a more realistic representation of
the demographic makeup of the "real" workforce.
Only the
remaining faculty members too old to take advantage of the best
incentives or any incentives at all if they are very senior, would be
negatively impacted. Those eligible faculty feeling pressured to retire
are not forced to do so and are no worse off than if the incentive
option were not offered.
The determination of the feelings of the decision maker is
subjective. From the point of view of some Americans, this would be
an uncomfortable decision because the policy entices many to retire
earlier than their health or productivity dictates and offers a benefit
that is not available to everyone. Others might feel comfortable with
the decision because it neither forces anyone into early retirement
nor takes any preexisting retirement rights or benefits away from
older faculty.
The Front-Page-of-the-Newspaper test is also somewhat subjective
because it requires the decision maker to consider the impact of
headlines regarding the decision.82 Part of this test is objective,
however, in that one must consider the impact of such headlines not
only on oneself but also on the company's reputation, and, therefore,
on future sales. In the context of higher education, such headlines
may affect consumer behavior because prospective students might
disapprove of a policy that appears unfair. Still, prospective students
are much more likely to be influenced by other factors, such as
school reputation and available programs and facilities, and, in fact,
might actually prefer a policy that resulted in a younger, more diverse
faculty. Thus, beyond the personal embarrassment that a decision
maker might feel if the policy received some negative publicity, this
test would not preclude offering age-staggered economic retirement
incentives in higher education.
The Laura Nash test would require that the decision maker ask
how he would feel if he stood on the other side of the decision, that
is, if he were an older tenured professor.8 If the decision withstands
this scrutiny, then one asks additional questions: "'Am I able to
discuss my decision with my family, friends, and those closest to me?'
'What am I trying to accomplish with my decision?"' and, finally,
"'Will I feel as comfortable about my decision over time as I do

8
83

See id.
See id. at 56.
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today?"' " Again, this is a subjective test, but it is one that would likely
result in just as many Americans deciding in favor of offering
economic incentives as against.
If one stands in the shoes of the "younger" senior faculty
members, then the incentives are a positive opportunity that one is
free to decline. Of course, if one considers the incentives from the
perspective of the oldest faculty members, it seems unjust that one is
excluded from the most generous retirement packages. Still, that
perspective is a snapshot, rather than a video, in that even the oldest
faculty could sign on for the incentive during the plan's initiation
phase. Moreover, once the incentives are in place for some time,
older professors actually will have had an even longer opportunity to
access the additional retirement funds, but will simply have outlived
that right. In both situations, older professors will have chosen not to
opt for the incentives while they could do so. It is difficult to feel
sympathy for those professors having made this free choice. Finally,
one's comfort with the decision to offer incentives seems to turn on
one's level of commitment to the goals behind the policy as well as on
one's belief in the overall fairness of the policy. This Author believes
that many decision makers would feel comfortable because the goals
of improving the faculty justify the program, and the initial offering
to all ages seems to make the program fair.
The Wall Street Journalmodel begins by asking about compliance
with laws.8 Economic incentives pass this step. Next, one must
consider both the contributions and the consequences to a spectrum
of stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, community, and
customers." The higher education equivalents seem to be alumni,
faculty and staff, college and local community, and students. Here,
only the oldest members of one of these groups are disadvantaged by
the incentives, so the benefit to all other stakeholders arguably
outweighs this one negative impact.
A similar analysis results from a utilitarian 87 perspective, which is
a version of teleology. A utilitarian perspective calls upon the
decision maker to do what is the greatest good for the greatest
number of people. Indeed, the only teleologist likely to oppose

8

Id.

See id. at 56.
86

SeeJENNINGS,

supra note 77, at 56-57.

basic approach of utilitarianism is that an action is morally right if it
produces the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people affected by
the act. Conversely, an action is wrong if it affects the majority adversely." CONRY ET
AL., supra note 78, at 43.
7"The
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economic retirement incentives would be the elderly egoist, who
considers only the consequences of the decision to himself.
Finally, a deontologist, employing Immanuel Kant's? categorical
imperative-"Do unto others as you would have them do unto
you"r-would likely decide in favor of the economic incentives as the
best way to maximize liberty and minimize differences. Most persons
would want a diverse, productive, motivated faculty as colleagues or
teachers. While some might focus on the inequities of the incentives
policy as something they would not want applied to themselves, when
put in the context of a voluntary policy that one simply outlives the
opportunity to utilize, the inequities seem minimal compared to the
positive impacts of a well-implemented policy.
IV. CONCLUSION: UNPOPULAR, BUT NECESSARY, CHANGE REQUIRES
COURAGE

Age-staggered economic incentives for early retirement in
higher education are legal under current United States law. There is
convincing precedential evidence that they would pass constitutional
muster, and, for almost a year, such incentives have been explicitly
endorsed by a bipartisan-sponsored federal statute, the amended
Higher Education Act, which itself appears able to withstand legal
challenge. In addition, only one of six ethical models, teleology,
clearly blocks the way for use of age-staggered economic incentives to
induce early retirement in higher education. Nonetheless, few
American colleges and universities are openly employing such
incentives.
Immanuel Kant is known as the founder of modern deontology. See id. at 45;
see also supra note 79 (discussing the principles of deontology). The ethics of this
famous philosopher
are based on the conclusion that persons are autonomous moral
entities who, by practical reasoning, give to themselves moral law.
From this base, Kant sought to discover the existence of an ultimate
moral law that all persons should strive to obey.
Basically, Kant's philosophy states a test that may be used to
determine whether an action, or principle of action, is moral. It can be
paraphrased as follows: The conduct or principle must be
universalizable. This means that for it to be moral, everyone must be
able to follow a principle or mode of conduct without generating an
inconsistent, self-defeating, or irrational situation. Thus if everyone is
commanded to act, the performance by some must not preclude or
interfere with the performance of the act by others. In Kant's words,
"Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time
will (i.e., intend] that it should become a universal law."
CONRYET AL, supra note 78, at 45 (alteration in original).
JENMNNGS, supra note 77, at
57.
88
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This reticence flies in the face of a nationwide trend toward
college policies stating a commitment to diversify faculties and to
minimize "dead wood." Are these policies mere lip service to public
pressure to be politically correct? To the contrary, this Author
submits that such an anomaly between policy and practice indicates
an ongoing administrative discomfort with either the legality or
ethicality of employing age-staggered economic incentives. Our
paradigmatic Dean must swallow hard and endorse the controversial
policy if he wants effectively and efficiently to achieve his goals for
older faculty. In molding appropriate policies for the management
of higher education faculties in the new millennium, deans,
presidents, and trustees must have the courage to answer the hard
questions. While these particular economic incentives may be
unpopular with the most senior and, thus, most influential faculty
members, they are indeed necessary, legal, and ethical, and therefore
ought to be implemented post haste.

